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INNOVATIVE BEHAVIOUR, TRUST AND PERCEIVED WORKPLACE 
PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Building on theories of social exchange, enactment, and trust, we provide a theorization of 
innovative work behaviour at the individual (IB) and team (IBT) levels and explain how desirable 
performance returns occur for individuals and teams. We further propose that horizontal 
(between team members) and vertical (between teams and their supervisor) team trust moderate 
the relationship between IBT and team performance. The results based on surveys conducted at 
two points in time in a large insurance company in the Netherlands show that employees’ IB is 
positively associated with perceived workplace performance at the individual and team levels 
and that the effects vary based on the forms of trust at play. Our findings offer important new 
knowledge about the consequences of entrepreneurship and innovation in the workplace and the 
significant role that trust plays in enabling such behaviour to promote perceived workplace 
performance, particularly in the vital financial services sector.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Conditions in the global business environment demand that established firms pursue growth via 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Such a strategy denotes a continuous and consistent reliance on 
innovative behaviour across organizational levels (Bednall et al., 2018; Ireland, Covin and 
Kuratko, 2009). However, most studies of firm entrepreneurship focus only on the 
entrepreneurial and innovative behaviours and dispositions of top managers or firm owners (e.g., 
Covin and Slevin, 1989; Sieger, Zellweger and Aquino, 2013), neglecting that organizational 
members across all organizational levels can potentially contribute to entrepreneurship and 
innovation within a firm (Ireland et al., 2009; Mustafa, Martin and Hughes, 2016; Wales, 
Monsen and McKelvie, 2011). Innovative behaviour1 (IB) by employees is considered to be of 
crucial importance for continuous innovation, improvement and corporate entrepreneurship (De 
Jong and Den Hartog, 2010; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999; Van de Ven, 1986; Van de Ven and 
Engelman, 2004). Yet, innovation is a risky endeavour (Farr and Ford, 1990; Van de Ven, 1986; 
Yuan and Woodman, 2010) meaning that the performance benefits resulting from IB in terms of 
personal and career success are often unclear to the employee. Exhibiting innovative behaviour 
therefore represents a form of entrepreneurial risk-taking on the part of the individual employee. 
Job characteristics are an important antecedent of IB as higher level employees, managers, 
and R&D workers have different opportunities to exhibit IB, are expected to behave in more 
innovative ways, and have more opportunities to diversify the risks associated with IB (Hornsby 
et al., 2009; Jansen, 2000; Oldham and Cummings, 1996). Still, within the confines of their 
defined roles, lower-level employees and non-R&D workers can deploy IB in such a way that it 
may manifest in improved workplace performance. Regrettably, we know little of the manner in 
which IB impacts an employees’ perception of their own or their team’s workplace performance. 
Addressing this knowledge gap will lend insight regarding factors that condition the outcomes of 
                                                          
1 Following Yuan and Woodman (2010), we define innovative behaviour as an employee’s intentional 
introduction or application of new ideas, products, processes and procedures to his or her work role, work unit 
or organization. 
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individuals’ use of IB separately and in team settings (Hornsby et al., 2009; Mustafa et al., 2016; 
Scott and Bruce, 1994; Yuan and Woodman, 2010). 
We use social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958, 1974) to 
explain under which conditions non-managerial employees will deploy IB in pursuit of 
perceived workplace performance. Perceived workplace performance captures an individual’s 
perception of the level of exhibited workplace performance, which is affected by the 
prevailing performance standards within a firm (Bommer et al., 1995; Lance et al., 2010; 
Lance et al., 2008). Such perceptions of work performance are important as employees will 
only deploy IB when they intuitively expect that favourable performance outcomes will occur 
(Drazin, Glynn and Kazanjian, 1999; Van Eerde and Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964; Yuan and 
Woodman, 2010), and, under social exchange theory, when IB is valued by their managers 
(Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958, 1974). Employees are not expected to automatically use IB 
as its use, due to the risks associated with innovative and entrepreneurial actions, creates 
uncertainty about whether performance will greatly improve. We use enactment theory 
(Weick, 1988, 1995, 2001) to resolve this contradiction, to anticipate how performance might 
come about, and to anticipate how trust strengthens the IB–perceived performance 
relationship when employees operate within teams. We address two questions: (1) To what 
extent does IB at the individual and team levels affect perceived individual and team 
workplace performance? (2) Does trust moderate the effects of IB within teams on their 
perceived team workplace performance? 
We contribute to innovative work behaviour, management and entrepreneurship research in 
three ways. First, we focus on the IB of lower-level employees and the work teams in which they 
participate, giving primacy to under-represented groups in research on innovative and 
entrepreneurial organizations. Scant empirical research is dedicated to whether first-level 
managers and non-managerial employees contribute to innovation within firms. This is despite 
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several calls to better understand, theoretically and empirically, the manner in which individuals 
might contribute to innovation and the entrepreneurship of firms (De Clercq, Dimov and 
Thongpapanl, 2010; Wales et al., 2011). 
Second, current empirical work at the employee level focuses on how organizations can 
stimulate innovative behaviour amongst their personnel (e.g., De Jong, Parker, Wennekers and 
Wu, 2015; Scott and Bruce, 1994), taking for granted that a strong focus on IB at all 
organizational levels is desirable. At the firm level, meta-analytical results (Rauch et al., 2009) 
and comparative research (Rigtering et al., 2013) indeed suggest that innovativeness and firm 
level entrepreneurship generate superior returns regardless of the industry in which a firm 
operates. However, whether favourable performance returns occur at other organizational levels 
and in departments in which IB is not automatically called upon is unknown.  
Third, our empirical research was conducted within the front office and operations 
department of a major insurance company in the Netherlands. This setting enables us to study IB 
when perceived (team) performance does not necessitate an innovative approach. In such 
settings, trust gains in importance as team members rely on co-workers and supervisors to 
migrate the uncertainty stemming from the deployment of IB. We offer a theoretical contribution 
by locating IB in this debate and reveal the complex interaction effect between two forms of trust 
that are absent from theoretical and conceptual treatments to date. The financial service sector is 
an interesting case for management, entrepreneurship and innovation researchers because it has 
been confronted by complex events that blur industry boundaries and by the entry of new 
competitors using a raft of new technologies previously unseen in the industry, both of which are 
causing rapid change (Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2006; Setia, Venkatesh and 
Joglekar, 2013). Innovation in financial services firms is increasingly required to develop better 
and more trustful customer relations (Nüesch, Puschmann and Alt, 2012) and improve firm 
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performance (Richard, Barnett, Dwyer and Chadwick, 2004). The front office and operations 
department are central to the customer experience. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Social exchange theory and individual behaviour 
Workplace interactions generate implied (but not prespecified) obligations (Emerson, 1976; 
Saxton, Wesley and Saxton, 2016). When two or more actors exhibit behaviours, each is 
reinforced by the behaviour of the other(s) (Homans, 1958). It is these manifest behaviours 
that create obligations for performance (Emerson, 1976), but on the understanding that the 
initiation of the behaviour and its performance effects are interdependent and contingent on 
the actions of another (Blau, 1964). Within an organization then, social exchange theory 
(SET) can explain behaviour and performance within employee–manager relationships and 
between individuals and team members (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). 
Under SET, individuals engage in behaviours based on five propositions (Emerson, 
1976; Homans, 1974): 
(1) The success proposition: the more an action is rewarded, the more it is repeated. 
(2) The stimulus proposition: if a stimulus has led to a person’s actions to be rewarded, 
the person will likely repeat the action. 
(3) The deprivation-satiation proposition: if a person has received a particular reward 
often in the recent past, any further unit of that reward will be less valuable. 
(4) The value proposition: if the result of an action is valuable to a person, the more likely 
the action will be performed. 
(5) The rationality proposition: in choosing between alternative actions, a person will 
choose the one perceived to be of highest value based on the result and its probability. 
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Propositions 1-4 specify that an individual employee must carry out some form of 
action prior to receiving a reward. This would be the initial forming of the relationship 
between the individual and an important other (e.g., a first-line manager or team member). 
No voluntary action would follow without such a relationship (Blau, 1964). The rationality 
proposition (5) describes the “voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the 
returns they are expected to bring” (Blau, 1964, p. 91). Returns (or rewards) are not solely 
economic but socioemotional as well (Emerson, 1976). The level or frequency of social and 
reciprocal behaviour is sustained by reinforcing activity from other people. Positive social 
exchange relationships between individual employees, their first-line managers and their 
team members motivate those individuals to behave in ways that reward and reinforce those 
positive relationships (e.g., Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). The individual is likely to be 
invested in their managers under these circumstances (e.g., Mustafa et al., 2016; Sieger et al., 
2013). A meaningful reward to that manager would be superior workplace performance by 
the individual employee. Positive social exchange will compel the individual to seek means 
to perform their tasks in new and better ways, triggering IB (Bednall et al., 2018; Scott and 
Bruce, 1994). There is no assurance the behaviour will lead to a positive outcome. But the 
intent is to create a positive improvement that rewards the social exchange. This is the 
reciprocity principle (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 
1958; Meeker, 1971). 
Positive exchange relationships between individuals and their managers encourage 
individuals to volunteer innovative activity that goes beyond role prescriptions (Bammens, 
2016; Zhang and Jia, 2010). This is consistent with the concept of organizational citizenship 
behaviour, which associates extra-role behaviour with increases in individual performance 
(Konovsky and Pugh, 1994; Podsakoff et al., 2009; Smith, Organ and Near, 1983). Assuming 
that individuals are motivated to achieve higher job rewards, the value proposition (4) 
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(Homans, 1974) holds that individuals are more likely to carry out actions that might lead to 
those rewards. Monsen, Patzelt, and Saxton (2010) and Scott and Bruce (1994) support this 
view, suggesting an individual will engage in IB when they expect some positive personal 
returns from their entrepreneurial actions. 
 
SET and the individual within a team context 
SET sees individual action as having ramifications beyond the individual level (Barnett, Long 
and Marler, 2012). Here, Homans (1958) argued that cohesiveness, a property that attracts 
people to take part in a group, is a value that draws social approval and rewards to that group. 
The ties that exist among individuals engaged in social exchanges affect their actions, 
including their willingness to adhere to or violate social norms (Qureshi, Kistruck and Bhatt, 
2016). The norm of reciprocity allows for individuals to be more trusting of, and committed 
to, one another (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Trust maintains social exchange (Konovsky 
and Pugh, 1994) and can affect the relationship between behaviour and performance 
(Homans, 1958, 1974). In line with Scott and Bruce (1994) and Yuan and Woodman (2010), 
among others, we propose that trust conditions IB aimed at improving workplace 
performance.  
Interpersonal exchanges generate or discourage trust (Tanghe, Wisse and Van Der Flier, 
2010), and this (dis)trust affects performance. Individuals have different trust referents (Dirks 
and Ferrin, 2001). It can be horizontal between an individual and their team members or 
vertical between an individual member and their supervisor (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 
1995; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). When employees trust their team colleagues and 
supervisors, they are more likely to engage in risk-taking and innovative behaviour aimed at 
exceeding task demands (Mayer et al., 1995). Without trust, their behaviour shifts towards 
self-protection (Colquitt et al., 2011) at the expense of entrepreneurial behaviour (Shepherd 
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and Krueger, 2002), innovation (Anderson and West, 1998; Caldwell and O'Reilly, 2003), 
and task performance. We therefore expect that horizontal trust and vertical trust will 
moderate the relationships between the IB of individuals and their teams’ workplace 
performance. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
IB and perceived workplace performance 
When an individual’s task or role is well-defined, its enactment is straightforward because 
work behaviours are formally prescribed. We use enactment theory (Weick, 1988) to predict 
why IB as an exchange-driven behaviour might benefit perceived workplace performance. 
When reciprocating for a positive social exchange with extra-role behaviour, the employee is 
likely to achieve higher task performance to reward that relationship by going beyond formal 
work behaviours with IB. In doing so, he or she encounters uncertainty calling for the 
individual to make sense of emerging events to achieve the desired outcome.  
Enactment theory predicts that to overcome the uncertainty caused by the effort to 
exceed normal performance in novel ways, the individual will use IB to make sense of 
emerging circumstances and shape the desired workplace performance. When operating 
under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, the individual exhibits constrained rationality 
(Weick, 2001). These individuals cannot predict that their IB will improve performance 
(Jansen, 2003; Yuan and Woodman, 2010). IB is not scripted so the individual must devise 
action as opportunities for innovation are recognized. This introduces the possibility that their 
sensemaking might be erroneous or faulty on occasions, unintentionally harming workplace 
performance. Still, an individual using his or her IB is generally directed to seek opportunities 
for improvement and consider new and better ways to perform tasks. Because the behaviour 
is novel and innovative , enactment theory sees the individual as taking actions to provide 
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meaning to this new experience (sensemaking) (Weick, 1995), to influence the perception of 
others (sensegiving) (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), to influence others to use similar 
behaviours (sensegiving to the team as part of negotiation), to process social information and 
experience for collective sensemaking (Barnett et al., 2012), so as to individually and 
collectively improve workplace performance. 
Moreover, individuals exhibiting IB may act as champions (Howell, Shea and Higgins, 
2005; Markham and Griffin, 1998) who take leadership for new product or service 
development and exercise informal influence to instigate innovation and change within firms. 
IB initiatives are then expected to improve workplace performance as the individual better 
foresees, anticipates, and detects opportunities for improvement and develops creative 
solutions to challenges encountered through this process (De Jong and Den Hartog, 2010; 
Scott and Bruce, 1994). 
These positive IB-associated performance effects could benefit the team in which an 
employee works as well. Individual members contribute to workgroup performance in terms 
of skills, abilities, attitudes, behaviours, and outcomes (Griffin, Neal and Parker, 2007; Hoegl 
and Gemuenden, 2001). A workgroup represents the [semi]permanent team to which 
individuals are assigned and whom they interact with regularly to perform tasks (Anderson 
and West, 1998). IB may impact the performance of teams when individual initiatives change 
work (procedures) or introduce innovations that may improve the way several employees 
perform their duties. Also, during sensemaking, an individual must influence the perception 
of others (sensegiving) and influence others to use similar behaviours to collectively advance 
new initiatives (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 2001), particularly in novel and 
uncertain situations (Cornelissen, Mantere and Vaara, 2014). Given role interdependency in 
work teams (Griffin et al., 2007), and given the interaction principle in enactment theory 
(Weick, 2001), IB is expected to contribute to perceived team performance as well. Thus: 
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Hypothesis 1: IB is positively related to (a) perceived individual performance and (b) 
perceived team performance. 
 
IB within a work team context 
When individual-level behaviour is embedded in interactions between team members, it can 
manifest as a higher-level phenomenon (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000), which we describe as 
IBT. This higher-level phenomenon (IBT) can affect team and individual performance. 
Because IB is a ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon, in that it has its theoretical origin at a lower level 
but has emergent properties at higher levels (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000), we assume that 
implementing work-related improvements starts with individual actions and behaviour. 
Innovations or work improvements require idea generation which is an individual-level 
process (Somech and Drach-Zahavy, 2013). Consequently, we think of an employee that 
exhibits IB as a resource that a team can draw upon, while the team provides the context in 
which IB occurs (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). The pool of individual-level IB resources 
available within a team thus constitutes the configuration of IBT.  
We build upon Kozlowski and Klein’s (2000) pooled constrained emergence prototype 
of team composition to explain the nature of IBT as an aggregate of IB. Pooled constrained 
emergence asserts that there are processes that partially constrain the emergence of a 
collective phenomenon leading to restricted variability within teams. Complete equality of IB 
contributions within teams is restricted because employees embedded within the same team 
might experience the social exchanges in more positive or negative ways resulting in 
different levels of IB per team member. Theoretically, teams characterized by strong 
supervisor-member and member-member social exchanges will display high levels of IBT due 
to the quality of the exchanges and the principles of negotiation and reciprocity therein (Scott 
and Bruce, 1994). Quality exchanges between members are crucial in reducing conflict 
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between team members when individuals displaying IB champion new ideas (Jansen, 2003; 
Markhan, 1998).   
When individuals enact IB within a work team, team members interpret and explain 
these innovative behaviours by constructing rational accounts (Weick, 1995). These rational 
accounts address the uncertainty resulting from novel actions and enable or restrict further 
behaviour by team members (Maitlis, 2005). The social exchange resulting from the 
enactment of IB can build confidence in team members’ reliability and integrity, leading to 
shared expectations about behaviours and outcomes. The interpretations or actions resulting 
from IBT are not inherently positive though. For example, Cornelissen et al. (2014) discuss 
the failure of sensemaking under group conditions where interpretations become biased and 
perpetuated erroneously. But, teams in which members frequently display IB are likely to 
generate a climate supporting innovation (Anderson and West, 1998) consisting of 
participative safety, (social) support, and knowledge sharing (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 2003; 
De Clercq et al., 2010; Ozer, 2011). Thus, we expect positive results within a team context as 
IB is rooted in a desire to achieve positive outcomes to reciprocate for positive exchanges. 
Teams with a larger pool of IB resources can benefit when looking to make work-
related improvements. Teams able to rely on a larger pool of resources experience 
performance benefits since each individual member brings their unique expertise, 
background, and dispositions (Jordan and Troth, 2004). Teams that draw upon a larger pool 
of IB resources may then generate more creative solutions and make use of a larger array of 
expertise. Although teams might experience such benefits in general, IBT is needed to convert 
these benefits into team performance. Advantages from high IBT can also stem from the 
interactions among team members. Team norms can act as a form of social control that 
directs the IB of team members towards particular organizational outcomes (Chiaburu and 
Harrison, 2008; Ozer, 2011). Similarly, (social) support and knowledge sharing allow for the 
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collective scrutiny of entrepreneurial ideas, increasing the likelihood that more-complete 
information can be brought to bear on entrepreneurial acts, driving better-advised and higher-
performing decisions.  
For individuals, high levels of IBT within a team improve their workplace performance 
as they benefit from the collective dynamics created by other team members that also engage 
in IB. Knowledge sharing resulting from high levels of IBT allows individuals to better judge 
the appropriateness and viability of their innovative behaviours, meaning they can enact their 
IB in more effective ways. Additionally, safety and (social) support within high IBT teams 
motivates employees to persevere and allows them to draw upon team members when 
needed. IBT should then increase their individual performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: IBT is positively related to (a) perceived individual performance and (b) 
perceived team performance. 
 
Trust and IB within work teams 
In work teams, trust can affect the behaviour expended in pursuit of perceived workplace 
performance. When employees trust their team colleagues (horizontal trust) and supervisors 
(vertical trust), they are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour aimed at 
exceeding regular task demands (Mayer et al., 1995; Shepherd and Krueger, 2002). Without 
such trust, their behaviour shifts towards self-protection at the expense of entrepreneurship 
(Colquitt et al., 2011). 
Horizontal trust embodies the belief an individual has in the actions of co-workers, 
whose actions and behaviours they cannot control, and are vulnerable to (Mayer et al., 1995; 
Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008). In work teams, the social exchange among individuals can 
increase knowledge sharing and entrepreneurship (De Clercq et al., 2010), but the returns to 
team workplace performance may co-vary based on horizontal trust. Work teams require 
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more interaction, cooperation and exchange of information to coordinate their activities, and 
thereby require horizontal trust to be effective (Griffin et al., 2007). The team conditions 
generated by higher levels of horizontal trust produce higher levels of information exchange 
and cooperative behaviour (Tanghe et al., 2010) and set a team climate commensurate with 
innovation activity (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 2003; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001).  
Greater horizontal trust facilitates sensemaking to coordinate individual team members’ 
IB in pursuit of superior perceived performance. Collective sensemaking enables team 
members to overcome preconceptions about ideas that might not be fully understood by one 
actor alone (Weick, 2001). Although consensus can be erroneous, trust among the team 
members provides the lubricant for individuals to jointly devise new plans and actions. The 
outcomes of the innovative behaviour team members expend to exceed ordinary workplace 
performance will thus be materially affected by their peers. Trust (or distrust) among team 
members fosters (or attenuates) participation and potentially facilitates (or hinders) the 
coordination of innovative and entrepreneurial actions by individuals, elevating (or deflating) 
the overall performance consequences of those actions. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between IBT and team perceived workplace performance 
is positively moderated by the horizontal trust team members have with each other. 
 
Vertical trust embodies the belief an individual team member has in the support and 
reliability of the supervisor (as team leader) (Shamir and Lapidot, 2003). An individual team 
member must have confidence in the support of their supervisor because these individuals 
have influence over resource allocation, performance evaluation and reward. Under SET, 
high vertical trust would be expected to drive individuals to excel within their teams in 
reciprocity for the trusting relationship held with the supervisor (De Clercq et al., 2010). 
Aggregated to the team, vertical trust represents the combined willingness of team members 
to work towards the leader’s activities, goals and decisions (Dirks, 2000). We expect that 
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with high vertical trust, the IB of team members would be closely attuned to the performance 
expectations of the supervisor, with a desire to exceed those expectations.  
To exceed such expectations, individual team members must enact new plans and 
actions to deliver better and more novel ways to complete tasks. Vertical trust increases 
confidence that IB and the sensemaking attached to it will find favour with the supervisor. 
Where supervisors and their subordinates have trustful bonds, relatively stable dyads develop 
that can result in high-quality exchanges. In teams, these subordinates often reciprocate for 
vertical trust through increased self-governance, knowledge sharing and cooperative 
behaviour (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001), and innovation (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 2003). Members 
are then likely to display more purposeful risk-taking (Mayer et al., 1995) due to the 
confidence that they will receive appropriate rewards and will not be undeservedly penalized 
by the supervisor if their efforts fail to result in targeted outcomes (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). 
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between IBT and perceived team workplace performance 
is positively moderated by the vertical trust team members have in their direct 
supervisor. 
 
When the supervisor and subordinates are contained within the same team, vertical trust 
may strengthen the moderating effect of horizontal trust on a team’s perceived workplace 
performance. Even though horizontal trust promotes information sharing, safety, and 
advances employees toward work goals, employees can still be subject to sanctions by 
managers if their sensemaking is applied erroneously (Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008; Ensher, 
Thomas and Murphy, 2001). At the team level, risk-taking occurs because the horizontal trust 
creates an environment in which employees are more likely to share their ideas (Chiaburu and 
Harrison, 2008; Ensher et al., 2001), but the effects of such a positive team climate can only 
be maximized if the likelihood that failures are heavily penalized is reduced through vertical 
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trust (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). Vertical trust thus creates a team environment needed for IBT 
and the championing of new ideas (Marham, 1998; Markham and Griffin, 1998). The 
increased knowledge sharing brought on by this trust aids sensemaking (Weick, 2001) and 
fosters idea development and innovation as well (Anderson and West, 1998; De Clercq et al., 
2010). Consequently, we expect IBT initiatives to be most positively associated with 
perceived workplace performance when high horizontal team trust and high vertical team 
trust exist simultaneously. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5: IBT, horizontal trust, and vertical trust have a positive three-way 
interaction effect on perceived team workplace performance; specifically, the 
relationship between IBT and perceived team workplace performance is most positive 
when vertical trust and horizontal trust are both high. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research setting, design and sample 
The empirical research was carried out at a major Dutch financial services firm. The financial 
service sector has faced considerable change in the last 15 years and innovation and 
entrepreneurship is needed to reengage customers that have become distant from the firm owing 
to new technologies and price-based business models (Airmic, 2016; Institute of International 
Finance, 2016; Jansen et al., 2006; OECD, 2017; Setia et al., 2013). The study was carried out at 
a leading insurance company in The Netherlands (‘The Company’). It employs approximately 
1,900 people and manages multiple brands. The organizational structure is function-based and 
encompasses six departments: front-office, operations, purchasing, commerce, IT, and human 
resources. We carried out our research at the two largest departments: the front office and 
operations department. The front office primarily deals with direct contact with customers. The 
majority of employees within this department assist customers with all types of questions in a 
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call centre setting providing after-sales service and product information. The majority of the 
employees in the operations department are responsible for customer care including the timely 
handling of all claim forms and other administrative tasks. The Company makes use of formally-
recognized teams, each with their own manager. We collected data through two intranet-based 
surveys. The second survey was sent one month after the first survey. By collecting data at two 
different points in time, a single response and common method bias is reduced (Podsakoff et al., 
2003).  
The first survey included the measurement scales for horizontal and vertical trust, team 
performance, and basic control variables (gender and age). The second survey included the IB 
and individual employee performance measurements as well as more detailed control variables 
(education, organizational experience, and team experience). We followed Dillman’s (1978) 
protocol to protect the identity of the respondents, maintain confidentiality, explain the reporting 
of our research findings, and reassure that individual scores would not be reported to 
management. All 1,247 employees received an invitation to complete the survey. Those 
employees that assume a managerial position were excluded from the survey. After two weeks, a 
reminder was sent by senior management to increase response. In total 1,104 surveys were 
returned for a response rate of 88.53 percent. The respondents belonged to 129 different teams. 
For the second survey sent one month later, the exact same procedure was used. In total, 628 
surveys were returned for a response rate of 50.36 percent. A response rate of over 50% is still 
widely regarded as sufficient for analytical purposes (Babbie, 2004) and the drop in response rate 
is most likely the result of the low willingness of respondents to fill in questionnaires in general 
(see Dillman, 1978). Most respondents were female (73% in survey 1, 69% in survey 2), the 
average age was 39 years, 36% were highly educated, 32% had been employed at The Company 
for one to five years with a further 48% for over ten years and most (65%) had one to five years 
of experience in their team.  
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Both surveys included a team code to aggregate the individual datasets to the team level. 
However, due to Company privacy regulations, the survey could not include a unique respondent 
number and could not be merged at the individual level. Although we reduce the danger of 
contemporaneous biasing (both forms of trust and team performance were collected one month 
before the IB data were collected), the individual employee performance measure had to be 
collected together with the IB measure. The 628 respondents of the second survey were members 
of 103 different teams, each consisting of at least two employees. Teams consisting of 
respondents that only filled in the first survey or the second survey were excluded from the 
analysis. The number of usable respondents from the first and second survey is then lowered to 
1,046 and 615 respectively. The total number of teams is 99. Team size varies between 2 
members per teams (smallest team) and 31 team members (largest team). On average, teams 
consist of 10.75 team members.  
 
Measures 
Given our focus on non-managerial employees within the front office and operations department 
of a financial services firm, we developed an IB measure that is tailored to the contextual 
situation with The Company. We argue that attitudinal and behavioural components are needed 
to operationalize IB and to manifest a temporal stability towards innovation (De Jong et al., 
2015). Furthermore, self-efficacy towards mastering new routines, procedures, and ways of 
working is important (Bolton and Lane, 2012). Items were generated to assess the respondents’ 
favourability toward workplace innovation and risk-taking―as indicated by their amenability to 
and self-professed proficiency at workplace innovation―and the frequency with which they 
initiate workplace innovation with respect to their job. The contextual situation within The 
Company was taken into account while formulating these items. Items are presented in Table 1 
and were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale.   
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At the team level, we used Kozlowski and Klein’s (2000) pooled constrained emergence 
prototype to explain the nature of IBT as an aggregate of IB. Accordingly, the IB of the 
individual team members is used to calculate the level of IBT. Pooled constrained emergence 
assumes restricted within-team variance and given this assumption the aggregate (mean) value of 
IB should be assigned to the team (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). This measurement approach 
recognizes that individuals’ specific actions are largely responsive to the contexts in which those 
individuals work. 
To measure horizontal trust and vertical trust, we use items consistent with other 
measurement instruments containing indicators of horizontal and vertical trust, including Braun, 
Peus, Weisweiler and Frey (2013), Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong and Van de Bunt (2008) and 
Butler (1991). Five-point Likert-type scales are used. 
Performance within The Company was measured against top management’s vision of 
improving product-service quality. Meeting key performance indicators, implementing and 
initiating new procedures for customer satisfaction, and the timely and correct handling of 
administrative tasks are of the essence. To capture these criteria, our measure of perceived team 
performance consisted of four items based on Jung and Sosik (2002) and González-Romá, 
Fortes-Ferreira and Peiró (2009) that cover team members’ perceptions of their team’s focus on 
quality and relative team performance. All items were measured on a five-point Likert-type 
scale. As in Fletcher, Major and Davis (2008), a single-item question was used to measure 
perceived individual workplace performance. Individual employees within The Company are 
evaluated on a regular basis by their direct supervisor and receive a performance grade ranging 
from 1 (worst performance) to 10 (excellent performance). Evaluation criteria include the 
employees’ contribution to customer satisfaction and ability to, in an accurate and timely 
fashion, handle calls, customer complaints, minimize errors, and perform administrative duties. 
Respondents were asked to report the grade they expected to receive at the next upcoming 
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evaluation with their direct supervisor. Fletcher et al. (2008) show that such estimations are 
highly correlated with actual performance evaluations by direct supervisors. Collectively, these 
activities and their performance are vital to the customer experience and necessary for financial 
service sector firms to overcome competition and technologies that have led to large customer 
churn rates. 
To control for differences between individual employees and team composition, the control 
variables gender (coded as zero for females, one for males), age, and education (coded as zero 
for vocational training, one for Bachelor degree or higher) were used. The experience of the 
respondent within the organization (coded as zero for less than five years of experience and one 
for more than five years of experience), the experience of the respondent within their current 
team (coded as zero for less than one year and one for more than one year of experience), and 
team size were included to control for team dynamics. We also control for differences between 
the two departments using a dummy variable (coded as zero for operation department and one 
for front office). 
 
Common method variance 
As company regulations did not allow us to add a unique and personal respondent number, 
measures for individual workplace performance and IB were collected together in the second 
survey. This may generate a common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which we test 
with a Harman single factor test (Richardson, Simmering and Sturman, 2009; Siemsen, Roth 
and Oliveira, 2010). A common method bias might be a threat to the validity of the research 
when a single factor explains more than 50 percent of the variance in the data (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). The test results examining the items collected through the same questionnaire 
suggest that common method variance is not a threat to the validity of the research as the test 
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indicates that a single factor explains only 33.31 percent of the variance, well below the 
threshold of 50%. 
 
Analytical approach 
We first evaluate the constructs for reliability and validity in a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) at the individual level (Table 1). IB is measured in the second sample (N=628), the fit-
indices of the measurement model are: chi2(df)=41.02 (14), RMSEA=0.06, CFI=0.97, 
SRMR=0.04. Horizontal trust, vertical trust, and team performance are measured in the first 
sample (N=1048), and the fit-indices of the measurement model are: chi2(df)=127.79 (31), 
RMSEA=0.06, CFI=0.98, SRMR=0.04. Both CFA’s are identified via the 3-indicator rule (3 
items with factor complexity of 1 for each latent variable) (see Bollen and Davis, 2009). The 
Cronbach Alpha for all scales exceeds 0.70. In two cases (IB and Perceived Team Performance) 
the average variance extracted (AVE) is less than 0.5. However, Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
argue that AVE values less than 0.50 are acceptable when the composite reliability of the scale is 
greater than 0.60, as is the case here.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------- 
 
Next, we tested the appropriateness of aggregating the individual data to the team level.  
Table 2 shows two indices of agreement (rWG and ADM) and two indices of reliability (ICC1 and 
ICC2). For all items, we show that rWG>0.70, suggesting a strong agreement between team 
members on the individual scale items (Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). The Average Deviation 
(ADM) scores reflect the averaged difference for each team member’s item rating relative to the 
mean rating for his or her team. Values less than 0.80 indicate acceptable levels of agreement 
(LeBreton and Senter, 2007). Based on these results, the aggregation of individual data to the 
team level is appropriate. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) are reliability-based 
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approaches to check whether and how strongly a hierarchical analysis delivers additional 
information to one-level analyses. The ICC1 and ICC2 for team performance, horizontal trust, 
and vertical trust indicate that the scores on these variables are being influenced by team 
membership. The lower ICC1 and ICC2 for IBT indicate that the scores on this variable are more 
strongly affected by individual team member behaviours, suggesting that a multi-level analysis 
can deliver additional information to the one-level analysis. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------- 
 
To analyse hypotheses 1 and 2 about the effects of IB and IBT on (a) individual and (b) 
team performance, we applied a multi-level that allows the simultaneous consideration of 
different levels of hierarchically-structured data. We use a multi-level model with manifest 
covariates (MMC) using Mplus. The second part of our analysis pertains to hypotheses 3-5 and 
evaluates whether IBT, horizontal trust, and vertical trust have significant interaction effects on 
perceived team-level performance. 
 
RESULTS 
Correlations are shown in Table 3. To test hypotheses 1 and 2 that IB and IBT positively affect 
perceived individual and team workplace performance (Table 4), we first entered the control 
variables (model 1) and then added IB and IBT (model 2). We set p<.10 for significance.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here 
------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 proposing a positive effect by IB on individual (H1a) and team (H1b) 
performance receives full support (p<.001 in both instances). Hypothesis 2 proposing that IBT 
improves individual (H2a) and team (H2b) performance also receives full support (p<.001 in 
both instances).  
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Table 5 shows the estimates for the moderating effects suggested in hypotheses 3-5 on the 
relationship between IBT and team performance. We stepwise entered the control variables 
(model 1), IBT (model 2), vertical trust (model 3), and horizontal trust (model 4), and the 
interaction terms (models 5 through 8).  
In Table 5, we find a positive effect by IBT on team performance (p<.001) when both forms 
of trust are simultaneously considered (model 4) and vertical and horizontal trust have positive 
effects (p<.001 in both instances) on team performance. In model 7 we find a negative 
interaction term between both forms of trust and team performance, and in model 8 that team 
performance is enhanced when the trust constructs are negatively related to one another (p<.10). 
To test hypothesis 3, we examine the slope differences between pairs of slopes (Table 6). 
Taking the slope when horizontal and vertical trust are low as the baseline in each instance, we 
examine the slope of IBT on perceived team performance when horizontal trust is high and 
vertical trust is low (Hypothesis 3) and when vertical trust is high and horizontal trust is low 
(Hypothesis 4) (Dawson, 2014). Support for these hypotheses requires the slopes in the 
conditions of high vertical trust/low horizontal trust and low vertical trust/high horizontal trust to 
be different from the baseline condition. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here 
------------------------------- 
 
The significance test for slope differences (Table 6) supports hypotheses 3 (t=4.05; p<.000) 
and 4 (t=2.12; p<.05). However, Figure 1 shows that when teams have low levels of IBT, 
perceived team performance is highest under the condition of high vertical trust and high 
horizontal trust. But, when the degree of IBT increases, perceived team performance is highest 
under the condition of high horizontal trust and low vertical trust. Thus, the effects of IBT on 
team performance appear to be most positive when team members’ trust each other highly and 
their supervisor less so. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is not supported (t=.81; p=.42 [n.s.]).  
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
Scholars and managers have recognized the importance of individuals across the firm to its 
entrepreneurial endeavours, but few works have examined what effects innovative behaviour 
by employees in lower-level positions has on individual- or team-level performance. Our two 
most important findings are: (1) that IB affects perceived performance at the individual and 
team levels, and (2) that the relationship between a team’s average IB (IBT) and perceived 
workplace performance is moderated in complex ways by the horizontal and vertical trust 
that an individual has in their team colleagues and direct supervisor. These findings offer 
important new contributions to our understanding of entrepreneurship and innovation within 
firms. 
Within the confines of their defined roles, individuals can engage entrepreneurial 
activity associated with their perceived workplace performance and that of their team. This is 
important because studies that focus on how firms can stimulate entrepreneurial and 
innovative behaviour among employees have often taken for granted that this is desirable 
across organizational levels. We provide a theorization of what IB involves and evidence that 
desirable performance returns are perceived as occurring for individuals and teams that 
exhibit IB. These findings contribute important new knowledge to an emerging research 
agenda about the ‘sociology’ of entrepreneurship and innovation within firms (De Clercq et 
al., 2010; Hoegl and Parboteeah, 2006; Wales et al., 2011) and innovative behaviour (Bednall 
et al., 2018).  
We extend the theoretical and empirical treatment of trust in SET and enactment theory. 
We find that the IBT– perceived performance relationship interacts in complex ways with 
horizontal and vertical forms of trust. Prior research has explored the benefits of trustful 
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relationships for greater knowledge sharing among employees and diminished need for 
formal monitoring (De Clercq, Thongpapanl and Dimov, 2011). We add to this how 
employees’ trustful relations with their team members can generate greater returns to 
workplace performance from IB. Horizontal trust is important for the effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Trust is complex because individuals have different trust referents. Results indicate that 
when there is little trust in one’s supervisor, trust among team members is particularly critical 
to strengthening the relationship between IBT and team workplace performance (see a 
comparison of Figure 1 slope lines 3 and 4, as reported in Table 6). And, when there is little 
trust among team members, trust in one’s supervisor is particularly critical to strengthening 
the relationship between IBT and team workplace performance (see a comparison of Figure 1 
slope lines 2 and 4, as reported in Table 6). These results point to a substitution effect with 
regard to how trust affects the efficacy of IBT in driving perceived team workplace 
performance. The joint presence of high vertical trust and high horizontal trust is not only not 
necessary to enhance the positive impact of IBT on perceived team performance, this 
combination has the opposite effect. As shown in Figure 1, the relationship between IBT and 
team performance is most positive when horizontal trust is high and vertical trust is low. 
Because using IB and IBT is often discretionary and subject to tougher social sanctions in a 
team context, the supervisor can fade in importance. Also, as the use of IB can be outside the 
parameters of a job, the horizontal trust among team members may take on greater 
importance than vertical trust in the supervisor. These findings demonstrate the importance of 
the interaction between the trust individuals hold with their team members and the trust those 
individual team members hold with their direct supervisor in theoretical and empirical 
modelling of innovative work behaviour. 
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Still, these observations do not directly address the matter of how the presence of 
greater trust in one’s supervisor might dampen the positive moderating effect of horizontal 
trust on the IBT-team workplace performance relationship. One possibility is that when 
vertical trust is high, team members may not be as critically evaluative of their potential 
innovative behaviours because they will know that their supervisors will “have their backs” if 
the initiatives are unsuccessful. As such, an overall lower quality of entrepreneurial initiatives 
may follow, which could dampen the IBT-team workplace performance relationship. Thus, 
the findings suggest “some” amount of distrust between a group and their supervisor (low 
vertical trust) may lead to better-perceived performance when trust within the team is high 
(high horizontal trust). 
Such dynamics are poorly addressed in the corporate entrepreneurship literature, which 
concentrates mainly on (middle) managers’ role in supporting and coordinate entrepreneurial 
activities (e.g., Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko et al., 2005). Considering the role of IB in 
championing new ideas and instigating change, employees might act without the permission 
of those in higher positions and bypass traditional chains-of-command (Markham 1998; 
Howell et al., 2009). Under such conditions, vertical trust becomes less relevant and 
employees rely more on the support of their co-workers. 
 
Managerial implications 
The study results point to two principal managerial implications. First, while both forms of 
trust can enhance the IBT-team workplace performance relationship, IBT may be most 
beneficial for team workplace performance when individuals’ relationships with their 
supervisors are not so trustful that those individuals feel as if they can pursue any 
entrepreneurial initiative regardless of their quality. Having to prove to their supervisors that 
IB is warranted―and not simply asking those supervisors to trust in the veracity of their 
entrepreneurial ideas, or assuming that they will do so―is not necessarily a bad thing. 
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Accountability for IB is needed, and too much trust―particularly of the vertical variety―can 
make individuals feel absolved of any real responsibility for the consequences of their 
entrepreneurial behaviours, therefore leading to a lower quality of entrepreneurial initiatives 
being pursued. 
Second, the development of an organizational environment that supports entrepreneurial 
initiatives can be important to promoting workplace performance at the individual and team 
levels. Critical to the development of such entrepreneurship-supportive workplace 
environments is the promotion trustful relationships between employees and their team 
members.  Thus, the creation of trustful climates among team members should be a priority 
among managers seeking to realize the greatest benefits from bringing together 
entrepreneurially-inclined individuals in their organizations. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several noteworthy limitations and future research directions. First, we do not 
establish empirically whether or how IB and its team average might accumulate and 
aggregate to firm level entrepreneurship. This creates opportunities for future studies as the 
relationship between IB and firm-level entrepreneurial orientation (EO) might be bi-
directional. On the one hand, IB at lower organizational levels might create pockets of 
entrepreneurship that aggregate to advance the firm’s EO and firm performance. However, an 
IB may emerge in response to top managers’ adoption of a firm EO. Further multi-level 
research, comparing an aggregation model to a diffusion model, is essential. Studying IBT in 
relationship to the overall entrepreneurial culture or disposition within a department or unit 
also holds considerable potential. This speaks to recent works on the organizational 
pervasiveness of EO (Wales et al., 2011). An overarching criticism of the corporate 
entrepreneurship literature is that firm entrepreneurship might be hard to sustain because it 
28 
 
may rely on more than just firm-level EO (Hoskisson et al., 2011). The journey of individuals 
behaving innovatively in firms over time needs consideration. Our theorizing suggests this 
journey relies on understanding the social exchange in the enactment of IB.   
Second, the indicators and findings are restricted to customer service and administrative 
employees within a Dutch financial service sector setting. The typical Dutch workplace is 
characterized by relatively high levels of employee autonomy and relatively little hierarchy. 
Job autonomy can be an antecedent to individual entrepreneurial behaviour (De Jong et al., 
2015) and Dutch employees may display more IB than their counterparts in other countries. 
We cannot rule out that the autonomy of the individual and autonomy aggregated to the team 
level could explain an increase in IB. Future models would benefit from including autonomy 
as a predictor of both level 1 and level 2 variance on perceptions of performance. Relatedly, 
while innovation is important to financial service sector firms, there may be sector-specific 
dynamics at play that we do not detect. Thus, we caution that our results come from a single 
organization in which the measures bear some context specificity.  
Third, our study relied on self-reported data and subjective performance indicators. The 
collection of objective performance data was precluded by The Company’s privacy policies. 
Even though our self-reported performance indicators are generally accurate representations 
of their true-score counterparts (Fletcher et al., 2008), scholars should consider alternative 
measures. Objective performance indicators examined longitudinally might be ideal, and 
performance metrics beyond workplace or task performance may also help.  
Fourth, the entrepreneurial self-efficacy of organizational members requires 
investigation. The presence of entrepreneurial self-efficacy is assumed but not well-examined 
in our study (only one of the IB items relates to self-identified proficiency at job-related 
change). Future researchers might investigate whether phenomena such as trust increase the 
likelihood that those with low entrepreneurial self-efficacy will exhibit IB.  
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Finally, trust can operate more widely than described in our study and organizational 
policies can affect trust (Six and Sorge, 2008). Research is needed to better understand why 
the interaction between horizontal and vertical trust has varied effects on team performance 
with respect to IB. It is interesting in our findings that some degree of distrust between a team 
and their supervisor actually leads to increased perceptions of performance. The implications 
of these observations to understand trust and entrepreneurship in and across the firm are 
important avenues for scholarly research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our theoretical framing and empirical findings call for a continued debate on what conditions IB 
and its effects on valuable organizational outcomes across the different levels of a firm. We 
reveal the contributions of individual and team IB to perceived workplace performance but also 
show that the work context, in the form of trust in social exchange relationships, is an important 
contingency influencing the extent to which IB is associated with desirable work outcomes. 
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Table 1 
Constructs, Items, Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities on the Individual Level 
 
Construct Indicators (items) Mean Variance Skew Kurtosis 
Std. 
factor 
loading 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbach 
alpha AVE 
Fornell 
Larcker-
Ratio 
Innovative 
behaviour (IB) 
I value new plans and ideas, even if I feel 
that they could fail in practice 5.33 0.84 -0.79 1.22 0.56 
0.78 0.77 0.42 0.10 
I always try to find if (internal) clients have 
wishes or desires that they are not 
consciously aware of 
5.23 0.99 -0.62 0.59 0.55 
I am constantly looking for new ways to 
improve my performance at the job 5.64 0.85 -0.91 2.06 0.74 
I quickly master new routines, procedures 
and new ways of working 5.37 1.04 -0.55 0.30 0.75 
I have very little problems with renewal and 
change 5.72 1.13 -1.12 1.60 0.61 
Horizontal trust 
 
I have trust in our team 4.21 0.36 -0.58 1.84 0.94 
0.91 0.78 0.77 0.42 I can count on my co-workers when I really need them 4.22 0.37 -0.38 0.74 0.78 
The atmosphere within the team is good 4.18 0.41 -0.53 0.98 0.90 
Vertical trust I trust my direct supervisor 4.15 0.61 -1.14 2.28 0.81 
0.78 0.91 0.54 0.59 If I need my direct supervisor, he or she will be there for me 4.22 0.49 -0.99 2.37 0.68 
My direct supervisor trusts me 4.18 .055 -1.12 2.49 0.72 
Perceived team 
performance 
Within our team we work together to 
achieve the team goals 4.09 0.45 -0.60 1.18 0.66 
0.76 0.76 0.44 0.56 
Our teams actively makes sure that we 
achieve the goals of our (internal) clients 3.96 0.36 -0.68 2.06 0.56 
Within the team, we check if we have 
achieved our team goals 3.93 0.48 -0.72 1.52 0.72 
Our team works together to achieve better 
quality. 4.17 0.43 -0.72 1.60 0.72 
Note: IB is measured in the second sample (N=628); horizontal trust, vertical trust, and team performance are measured in the first sample (N=1048) 
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Table 2 
Indices for Aggregation of Items and Descriptive Statistics for Aggregated Constructs when Individuals are nested within Teams 
 
Constructs Item rWG>0.70 2  ADM<0.80 3 Mean Variance Skew Kurtosis ICC(1) 4 ICC(2) 5 
Innovative behaviour 
in Team (IBT) 
1 0.79 0.54 
5.50 0.33 -0.41 1.39 0.04 0.21 
2 0.79 0.54 
3 0.81 0.54 
4 0.80 0.51 
5 0.71 0.64 
Horizontal Trust 1 0.85 0.36 
4.23 0.10 0.29 0.60 0.16 0.66 2 0.84 0.37 
3 0.84 0.37 
Vertical Trust 1 0.77 0.46 
4.25 0.14 -0.19 0.57 0.15 0.65 2 0.80 0.42 
3 0.78 0.44 
Perceived Team 
Performance 
1 0.83 0.39 
4.05 0.10 -0.10 0.96 0.12 0.58 
2 0.85 0.35 
3 0.79 0.42 
4 0.81 0.40 
Note: Indices of Agreement (rWG), Average Deviation (ADM), and Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC); N= 99 Teams. 
  
                                                          
2 Klein and Kozlowski (2000) argue that strong agreement (rWG >0.70) can justify the aggregation of data to a higher level. 
3 A critical value of 0.80 or less is suggested for establishing agreement when using a 5-point scale (see LeBreton and Senter, 2007). 
4 Within-cluster reliability of 0.1 and larger indicates the dependence of observations in clusters (Bliese, 2000; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000).  
5 Values greater than 0.15 indicate reliability of cluster means (Bliese, 2000). 
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Table 3 
Correlations 
 
Level 1 (N=628) Mean (S.D.) TS G AGE EDU DEP OEX TEX IB PIP 
Team size (TS) 13.12 (4.90) 1         
Gender (G) 0.31 (0.46) 0.02 1        
Age (AGE) 2.48 (0.98) 0.02 -0.07 t 1       
Education (EDU) 0.36 (0.48) -0.13 *** 0.19 *** -0.24 *** 1      
Department (DEP) 0.39 (0.49) -0.03 -0.07 t 0.13 *** -0.15 *** 1     
Org. experience (OEX) 0.65 (0.48) -0.04 -0.03 0.46 *** -0.30 *** -0.08 t 1    
Team experience (TEX) 0.20 (0.40) -0.11 ** -0.03 0.23 *** -0.18 *** 0.13 *** 0.37 *** 1   
Innovative behavior (IB) 5.53 (0.68) -0.08 t 0.12 ** -0.07 t 0.20 *** 0.01 -0.12 ** -0.07 1  
Perceived individual performance (PIP) 7.39 (1.14) 0.01 -0.04 -0.16 *** -0.01 0.07 -0.11 ** -0.08 ** 0.24 *** 1 
 
Level 2 (N=99) Mean (S.D.) TS  G AGE  EDU  DEP  OEX  TEX  IBT  VTRUST HTRUST PTP 
Team size (TS) 10.75 (5.66) 1           
Gender (G) 0.31 (0.26) 0.04 1          
Age (AGE) 2.51 (0.57) -0.01 0.05 1         
Education (EDU) 0.39 (0.32) -0.13 0.23 * -0.37 *** 1        
Department (DEP) 0.48 (0.49) -0.18 t -0.11 0.35 *** -0.28 ** 1       
Org. experience (OEX) 0.67 (0.30) -0.11 0.01 0.60 *** -0.33 *** 0.10 1      
Team experience (TEX) 0.25 (0.30) -0.25 * 0.06 0.49 *** -0.44 *** 0.35 *** 0.45 *** 1     
Innovative behavior. team (IBT) 5.57 (0.41) -0.19 t 0.14 -0.27 ** 0.42 *** -0.04 -0.33 *** -0.23 * 1    
Vertical trust (VTRUST) 4.25 (0.36) -0.26 ** -0.06 -0.07 0.19 t -0.13 0.10 0.05 0.24 * 1   
Horizontal trust (HTRUST) 4.23 (0.28) -0.13 *** 0.17 * -0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.20 1  
Perceived team performance (PTP) 4.05 (0.24) -0.08 -0.03 -0.19  t 0.17 t -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.38 *** 0.40 *** 0.51 *** 1 
 
***p≤0.001 
**p≤0.01 
*p≤0.05 
t p≤0.10  
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Table 4 
Multi-level Model of the Effects of IB and IBT on 
Perceived Individual and Team Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Individual 
performance 
Team 
performance 
Individual 
performance 
Team 
performance 
Level 1 Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p 
Gender -0.04 (-0.87) 0.03 (0.70) -0.06 (-1.37) 0.01 (0.23) 
Age -0.16 (-3.74) *** 0.01 (0.23) -0.15 (-3.47) *** 0.00 (0.07) 
Education -0.05 (-1.08) -0.07 (-1.62) -0.08 (-1.69) -0.12 (-2.65) ** 
Org. experience  -0.02 (-0.41) 0.03 (0.59) -0.00 (-0.04) 0.05 (0.90) 
Team experience  -0.06 (-1.35) -0.00 (-0.48) -0.06 (-1.23) 0.01 (0.16) 
         
IB      0.22 (4.81) *** 0.19 (4.48) *** 
         
Level 2 Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p 
Team size -0.03 (-0.06) 0.28 (1.76) t 0.07 (0.30) 0.33 (2.29) * 
Department 0.96 (0.96) -0.18 (-1.28) 0.44 (1.70) t -0.15 (-1.20) 
         
IBT     0.83 (3.55) *** 0.60 (5.09) *** 
         
Pseudo-R2Level 1 0.04 (2.19) t 0.01 (1.19) 0.08 (3.34) *** 0.05 (2.67) ** 
Pseudo-R2Level 2 0.92 (0.48) 0.13 (1.17) 0.81 (2.00) * 0.43 (3.46) ** 
 
***p≤0.001 
**p≤0.01 
*p≤0.05 
t p≤0.10 
N=628 
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Table 5 
IBT Effects on Perceived Team Performance Moderated by Vertical and Horizontal Trust 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p Est. t-value p 
                         
Team size -0.06 (-0.51)  0.02 (0.20)  0.07 (0.75)  0.14 (1.73) t 0.14  (1.76) t 0.14 (1.75) t 0.12 (1.55)  0.13 (1.67) t 
Gender -0.05 (-0.47)  -0.09 (-0.94)  -0.04 (-0.44)  -0.16 (-2.03) * -0.16 (-1.97) * -0.16 (-1.96) * -0.17 (-2.21) * -0.18 (-2.33) * 
Age -0.17 (-1.23)  -0.15 (-1.16)  -0.12 (-0.98)  -0.09 (-0.87)  -0.12 (-1.15)  -0.12 (-1.16)  -0.10 (-1.01)  -0.11 (-1.16)  
Education 0.13 (1.04)  0.02 (0.18)  -0.03 (-0.29)  0.02 (0.20)  0.00 (0.03)  0.00 (0.03)  0.01 (0.06)  0.02 (0.16)  
Org. experience  0.04 (0.27)  0.11 (0.93)  0.03 (0.36)  0.10 (0.98)  0.10 (1.02)  0.10 (1.02)  0.09 (0.94)  0.10 (1.02)  
Team experience  0.02 (0.16)  0.06 (0.45)  0.01 (0.04)  0.02 (0.21)  0.05 (0.52)  0.05 (0.51)  0.07 (0.74)  0.08 (0.80)  
Department -0.02 (-0.19)  -0.05 (-0.49)  0.00 (0.03)  0.01 (0.09)  0.01 (0.17)  0.02 (0.23)  0.02 (0.22)  0.03 (0.33)  
                         
IBT    0.40 (3.94) *** 0.31 (3.15) ** 0.37 (4.42) *** 0.34 (3.85) *** 0.33 (3.73) *** 0.35 (3.98) *** 0.40 (4.35) *** 
Trust (v: vertical)       0.33 (3.62) *** 0.22 (2.68) ** 0.22 (2.67) ** 0.22 (2.68) ** 0.28 (3.45) *** 0.23 (2.55) ** 
Trust (h: horizontal)          0.51 (7.14) *** 0.49 (6.93) *** 0.49 (6.89) *** 0.59 (7.54) *** 0.65 (7.68) *** 
                         
IBT x trust (v)             0.12 (1.48)  0.11 (1.23)  0.00 (0.05)  0.05 (0.46)  
IBT x trust (h)                0.02 (0.25)  0.12 (1.31)  0.26 (2.08) * 
Trust(v) x trust (h)                   -0.24 (-2.57) ** -0.27 (-2.84) ** 
IBT x trust (v) x trust (h)                      -0.22 (-1.64) t 
                         
R2 0.06 (1.23)  0.17 (2.48) * 0.26 (3.43) *** 0.49 (6.83) *** 0.50 (7.10) *** 0.50 (7.06) *** 0.53 (7.77) *** 0.55 (8.07) *** 
 
***p≤0.001 
**p≤0.01 
*p≤0.05 
t p≤0.10 
N=99 
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Table 6  
Comparison of Slopes of the Perceived Performance Effect by the Combination of Trust 
Forms 
 
Pair of slopes 
t-value for slope 
difference 
p-value for slope 
difference 
 
(1) and (2): high vertical/ 
high horizontal vs. high 
vertical/low horizontal  -0.19 0.85 
 
(1) and (3): high 
vertical/high horizontal vs. 
low vertical/high horizontal -0.85 0.40 
 
(1) and (4): high vertical/ 
high horizontal vs. low 
vertical/low horizontal 
(hypothesis 5) 0.81 0.42 
 
(2) and (3): high vertical/low 
horizontal vs. low 
vertical/high horizontal  -1.01 0.32 
 
(2) and (4): high vertical/low 
horizontal vs. low 
vertical/low horizontal 
(hypothesis 4) 2.12 0.04 
 
(3) and (4): low vertical/high 
horizontal vs. low 
vertical/low horizontal 
(hypothesis 3) 4.05 0.00 
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Figure 1 
Plot of the Interaction Effects of Trust (Vertical and Horizontal) on Perceived Team 
Performance under Low and High Levels of IBT 
 
Note: High/Low values on the x-axis represent +/- one standard deviation from the scale 
mean. 
 
